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COMMENTS 
The FTC's Power To' Seek Preliminary Injunctions 
in Anti-Merger Cases 
Congress vested responsibility for enforcement of the anti-
merger provisions of the Clayton Act1 in the Department of Justice, 2 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),3 and private parties who 
claim to be injured by a merger.4 Courts permit the Department of 
Justice to use almost all remedial measures "reasonably necessary" 
to deal with mergers which are found to be violative of section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, 5 and the Act expressly authorizes the Department 
to seek preliminary relief in the district courts.6 Comparable statu-
tory authority is also given to private litigants.7 Until recently, 
however, it had always been believed that the FTC did not have 
authority to go to· court to obtain preliminary injunctions to bar 
corporations from proceeding with mergers which the FTC intended 
to attack under section 7.8 The FTC has often taken the position 
I. 15 u.s.c. §§ 12-27 (1964). 
2. 15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964). 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). See generally Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion and Mergers, 64 CoLU:M. L. REV. 500 (1964). Arguably, the FTC was originally 
intended to play a much more limited role than the Justice Department in the enforce-
ment of the Clayton Act. See generally G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
19-27 (1924). Moreover, ever since the enactment of the Clayton Act there has been a 
continuing debate over the remedial power available to these enforcing bodies. See 
generally Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets: Observations on Its Scope, 
Objective and Limitations, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1966). 
4. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1964). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323, 
329, 331 (1961). See also N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, 1965 ANTITRUSf LAw Sn.lPOSIUM 37-38 
(Trade Reg. Rep. ed.). The Justice Department's remedial measures spoken of in this 
connection are measures ancillary to or in lieu of divestiture. The FTC, however, has 
had considerable difficulty persuading the courts that its remedial powers are as broad. 
E.g., FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623 (1927) (suggesting that since it was 
created by statute, "the commission exercises only the administrative functions dele-
gated to it by Congress"). See also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952) and 
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946) for other statements concerning those 
remedial powers available to the FTC. 
6. 15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964). 
7. 15 u.s.c. § 26 (1964). 
8. As Mr. Justice Fortas observed, this view was even "repeatedly stated by spokes-
men for the FTC." FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 637-40 (1965) (appendix to 
dissent). See, e.g., Ekco Prods. Co., 1965 TRADE REG. REP. 1J 71,487 (FTC 1964); 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 465 (1956); id. ser. 15, at 28 (1956). 
See also Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, at 93 (1961); Dixon, Recent Developments in FTC 
Enforcement, 18 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRUsr LAw 107, 114 (1961}; Dixon, Significant New 
Developmen·ts, 21 A.B.A. SECT. ANTITRusr LAw 247, 255 (1962). Moreover, Mr. Justice 
Fortas was unable to find any commentator who disagreed with this limited concep-
tion of the FTC's power. For authorities which he cites as endorsing this limited 
position, see 384 U.S. at 614 n.2. 
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that it needs this authority to enjoin mergers in advance of their 
consummation in order to effectuate its enforcement powers.9 Its 
argument is that if companies are allowed to proceed with their 
merger plans while FTC proceedings are taking place, then by the 
time the proceedings are completed it may be highly difficult, if not 
impossible, for a :final order of divestiture to restore a competitive 
market situation.10 Admittedly, such mergers are not entirely im-
mune from attack under section 7 in the absence of FTC authority 
to obtain preliminary relief. The FTC could always request the 
Department of Justice to seek an injunction restraining a proposed 
merger.11 The FTC, however, has never believed that the mere 
power to make such a preliminary reference to the Justice Depart-
ment adequately effectuates the purposes of the statute; under the 
9. See generally id. at 636-40. On only one occasion has a court granted such power, 
and in that instance it was granted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, not to the ITC. Furthermore, without such preliminary relief the potential 
jurisdiction of a court of appeals would have been eliminated. Board of Governors 
v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1950); see note 53 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
IO. Completion of a merger will often mean that the merging companies no longer 
have available to them the personnel and management necessary for their independent 
existence. Moreover, because of the delay usually attendant to ITC adjudication of 
mergers, mergers not enjoined before their consummation may already have returned 
a substantial profit by the time they are found to be illegal. Often this delay will also 
mean that the separate reputations of the merging firms will no longer be intact when 
the ITC concludes its proceedings, and this loss of separate identities may make orders 
of divestiture an unrealistic solution. See generally Daly, Current Trends in Relief 
Under the Clayton Act, 70 DICK. L. R.Ev. 1 (1965); Edwards, Tests of Probable Effect 
Under the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BuLL. 369 (1964); see note 39 infra. 
The procedure used by the ITC in entering a final order of divestiture has been 
described as follows: 
The essence of ITC enforcement is an administrative order requiring the 
offending corporation to divest itself of the illegally acquired stock or assets. Prior 
to entering such an order, the ITC must issue a complaint to the corporation 
and to the Attorney General, hold a Commission hearing where the corporation 
may show cause why an order for divestiture should not be entered, and make 
a written report of the hearing. If the Commission then determines that the 
merger will violate the Clayton Act, it issues a cease and desist order to compel the 
corporation to divest itself of the stock or assets acquired through the merger. 
[Clayton Act § ll(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1964)]. The administrative order to cease 
and desist becomes final upon expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition 
for review in the court of appeals. [Clayton Act § ll(g), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(g) (1964)]. 
If review is requested by the corporation and the ITC order is affirmed, the 
court of appeals then issues its own order commanding obedience to the final 
ITC order. [Clayton Act § ll(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964)]. Violations of the final 
ITC order are subject to heavy civil fines. [Clayton Act § 11(1), 15 U.S.C. § 21(1) 
(1964)]. 
Note, 15 KAN. L. REv. 196 (1966). The delay involved in these proceedings has in fact 
prevented an effective order of divestiture on several occasions, e.g., United States v. 
Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 
F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal.), appellate juris. denied, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), affd, 84 S. Ct. 
•i (1963) (Goldberg, J., in chambers). See generally Note supra. 
11. It has been suggested that the Justice Department may be required to seek a 
preliminary injunction upon FTC request. See .J. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST 
L\ws 321 (1958). 
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existing statutory framework it is doubtful whether the FTC could 
make the reference without yielding control of the case.12 
In FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,13 the Supreme Court recently ruled 
in a 5-4 decision, that the FTC can seek a preliminary in junction 
from a federal circuit court of appeals in anti-merger cases. Thus, it 
closed the gap in the FTC's enforcement powers and substantially 
eliminated the historical imbalance between the authority of the 
Department of Justice and that of the FTC. This Comment will 
examine the bases and the implications of the Supreme Court's 
holding. It will point out a number of problems raised by granting 
the FTC this remedial power, and will suggest that the situations in 
which preliminary injunctions may be obtained from a court of 
appeals should be strictly limited. 
I. THE DEAN Foons LITIGATION 
In the Dean Foods case, the FTC attacked the proposed merger 
of Dean Foods and Bo,;vman Dairy, two of the nation's largest dairy 
companies,14 on the ground that the merger would violate section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),15 which prohibits 
unfair methods of competition, and section 7 of the Clayton Act,16 
12. The Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary has 
explained this resultant loss of control in the following manner: 
[C]areful scrutiny of the language of section 15 of the Clayton Act empowering 
the Attorney General to seek injunctions reveals that its provisions are not suffi-
cient to carry out the intent of Congress in amended section 7. Under the provi-
sions of section 15, if the Attorney General were successful in obtaining an 
injunction from a District Court in aid of the Federal Trade Commission, the 
court itself would be required to "[p]roceed, as soon as may be, to hearing and 
determination of the case.'' Thus, upon the obtaining of a district court injunc-
tion, the administrative proceeding would be at an end and the Commission 
would no longer have any power to hear and determine the case. This would 
defeat the statutory intent expressed in sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act of 
having the Federal Trade Commission hear and decide merger cases. 
H.R. REP. No. 1889, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1956). 
13. 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (majority opinion per Clark, J., joined by Justices Warren, 
Brennan, Black &: Douglas; dissenting opinion per Fortas, J., joined by Justices 
Harlan, Stewart &: White). 
14. On December 13, 1965 respondents entered into a merger agreement which 
provided for a transfer of assets on January 3, 1966 (later extended to January 10 by 
the parties). At this time Dean Foods Co. was approximately the twelfth largest dairy 
company in the United States, and the third or fourth ranking seller of packaged milk 
in the Chicago Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO) Area (Cook, DuPage, Kane, 
Lake and Will Counties, Illinois; Lake County, Indiana) with sales of $73 million, 
total assets of $25 million, and a net income of $2.8 million before taxes. Dean Foods 
Co. controlled 7% of the packaged milk sales in the Chicago FMMO Area. Bowman 
Dairy Co. was about the eleventh largest dairy company in the United States, and 
the first or second ranking seller of packaged milk in the Chicago FMMO Area with 
nearly 16% of the total sales. See Papers filed in principal case with the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit on Dec. 30, 1965 [hereinafter cited as Papers] (on file in 
the offices of the Michigan Law Review). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964) ("Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.''). 
16. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1964): 
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which prohibits one corporation from acquiring another when "the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly." After filing its complaint, the FTC 
petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to enjoin 
the companies from consummating their proposed merger pending 
completion of the FTC's adjudication of its complaint.17 The court 
denied the requested injunction, holding that under the Clayton 
Act the FTC could only exercise powers delegated to it by Congress 
in section 11, and that section 11 did not authorize the FTC to 
obtain preliminary injunctions.18 On appeal,19 the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit.20 The Su-
preme Court held that the FTC could properly seek the preliminary 
injunction in the court of appeals which has the authority under 
the All Writs Act to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of" its jurisdiction,21 since consummation of the merger might create 
a situation in which the court of appeals would be unable to enforce 
an effective remedial order. 
On remand, the Seventh Circuit held hearings on the FTC's 
petition for a preliminary injunction, and enjoined Dean and Bow-
man from proceeding with their proposed merger for a period of 
four months from the date of the order.22 The court based its de-
No corporation •.• shall acquire ..• any part of the stock ... and no corpora-
tion subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire 
... any part of the assets of another corporation ..• where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
17. The complaint, which charged violations of the antimonopoly laws, was issued 
on December 22, 1965 and was followed on December 30, 1965 by a petition seeking 
an injunction against the contemplated merger. On January 4, 1966 the court of 
appeals entered a temporary restraining order enjoining consummation of the merger 
until five days after the denial of any injunctive relief. 
18. Relief was denied the FTC on January 19, 1966. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 
F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1966). 
15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1914) provides in pertinent part that: 
If upon such a hearing the Commission ... shall be of the opinion that any of 
the provisions of said sections have been or are being violated, it shall make a 
report in writing, in which it shall state its findings as to the facts, and shall 
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to 
cease and desist . . . . 
See discussion thereon in note 3 supra. 
19. On January 24, 1966 the Supreme Court, per Clark, J., ordered a temporary 
stay, restraining respondents from making any material changes with respect to the 
assets purchased or Bowman's corporate structure. This order permitted Dean to sell 
Bowman's retail home delivery routes upon terms and conditions acceptable to the 
FTC, but required that any milk supplied by Dean to such purchasers continue to be 
delivered from former Bowman plants under the Bowman label. The FTC filed its 
petition for certiorari on January 31, 1966, certiorari being granted on February 18, 
1966. 
20. 384 U.S. 597 (1966). 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1964). 
22. The court's order, issued on July 18, 1966, enjoined Dean and Bowman from 
making any material changes "with respect to the capital stock or corporate struc-
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cision on the belief that it was "reasonably probable" that the FTC 
would find the merger agreement in violation of section 7 of the 
Clayton Act and section 5 of the FTC Act.23 Contrary to the Seventh 
Circuit's prediction, the FTC hearing examiner dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that the evidence did not support the allega-
tions,24 but his decision was reversed by the FTC, which held, one 
Commissioner dissenting, that the proposed acquisition "had the 
probability of substantially lessening competition."25 
II. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
The legal foundation for the Supreme Court's decision that the 
FTC can institute proceedings in a court of appeals to obtain a pre-
liminary in junction was not overly impressive, as the dissent by 
Justice Fortas makes clear.26 The FTC's responsibilities are defined 
by statute, thus it was unclear whether the agency could bring such 
an action absent express statutory authorization,27 especially since, 
although both the Department of Justice28 and the FTC29 have 
ture of Bowfund Corporation, or with respect to assets purchased by Dean from 
Bowman pursuant to their agreement" for a period of four months. FTC v. Dean 
Foods Co., Slip Opinion No. 15,493 (7th Cir. July 18, 1966). The reference to the Bowfund 
Corporation is explained by the fact that as of July 19, 1966 the Bowman Dairy 
articles of incorporation were amended so as to change its name from Bowman Dairy 
Co. to Bowfund Corporation. 
23. Id. 
24. In re Dean Foods Co., FTC Proceedings, Doc. No. 8674 (Initial Decision Sept. 
7, 1966). 
25. In re Dean Foods Co. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,i 17,765 
(FTC 1966). In dissent, Commissioner Elman asserted that the integrity of the Com• 
mission's adjudicatory function had been impaired by its statements to the court of 
appeals during argument on the preliminary injunction. He stated: 
Judicial open-mindedness requires that there be no prejudgment of the merits, 
actual or apparent. Any expressions or hint in the injunction proceeding that 
the Commission has already formed a judgment adverse to the respondents on the 
basic factual issues of the case completely destroys that appearance of open-
mindedness which is essential to fair adjudication. 
Id. ,I 17,765 at 23, 126. 
26. 384 U.S. 597, 612-40 (1966). 
27. For cases recognizing the authority of agencies to petition the courts for relief, 
see Public Utilities Comm'n v. Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1954); 
Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 
U.S. 883 (1950); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Atlantic &: Gulf-Panama Canal Zone, 241 
F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies 
and Procedures § 45 (1951). For cases denying such authority, see FTC v. International 
Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co., 
148 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. granted, 324 U.S. 837, judg. vacated as moot, 325 U.S. 
833 (1945), subsequently disapproved in West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948) petition for cert. dismissed on petitioner's 
motion, 336 U.S. 908 (1949); Trans-Pacific Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime 
Bd., 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See generally FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 
597, 615-18 (1966). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964) (vesting district courts with jurisdiction to prevent and 
restrain violations of the act at the suit of the Government). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). See note 3 supra. 
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concurrent jurisdiction to enforce section 7, only the Department 
of Justice was expressly authorized to institute temporary injunction 
proceedings.30 Moreover, the power to seek preliminary injunctive 
relief was also expressly given to private litigants threatened with 
loss or damage from antitrust violations.31 Congress' failure to grant 
such express authority to the FTC32 might well justify an inference 
that it did not intend to delegate to the FTC the same duties with 
respect to restraining Clayton Act violations as it delegated to the 
Department of Justice or to private litigants.33 Furthermore, be, 
30. 15 u.s.c. § 25 (1964). 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). However, a private party must demonstrate that, unless 
the order is issued, irreparable loss or damage will result. 
32. It is noteworthy that on a number of occasions Congress has expressly au-
thorized other administrative agencies to seek, and the district court to grant, tempo-
rary relief in aid of the agency's general enforcement authority. See, e.g., Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1964); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1964); 
Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964); Public Utility Holding Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 79r(f) (1964); Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § SOa-41 (1964); Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1964); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 825m(a) (1964); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1964); Atomic Energy Act, 
42 u.s.c. § 2280 (1964). 
The FTC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are expressly empowered 
to preserve the status quo pending some administrative determinations. For example, 
under the Food and Drug provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC 
is given a power closely analogous to the authority which it sought in Dean Foods, 
that is, the power to seek, in a district court, a temporary injunction against false 
advertising or misbranding of food, drugs and cosmetics. Wheeler-Lea Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 53(a) (1964). For further examples of specific authorization regarding the FTC, see 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1964); Wool Products Labeling Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 68(e)(b) (1964); Fur Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 69g(b); Textile 
Fiber Products Identity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70£ (1964). Regarding the NLRB, see National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j) & (f) (1964) (NLRB is required to seek tempo-
rary injunction when it has reason to believe that jurisdictional strikes or secondary 
boycotts exist). The Federal Power Commission (FPC), Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) have also been 
authorized to preserve the status quo through the issuance of their own orders. 
15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1964) (FPC); 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1964) (FCC); 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(g), 
318(c) (1964) (ICC). 
33. For an application of the doctrine that exclusio amus est exclusio alterius, that 
the express grant of authority to one body is an implied denial to another, see SEC 
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 148 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1945). However, this maxim 
has generally been used only as an aid to construction, and arguably should not be 
allowed to contravene the purpose of an act. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 
356 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, 
R. Is. &: Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 649 (1934). Therefore, it would appear that at least a 
modicum of evidence showing congressional intent to withhold that power which the 
agency considers vital is required before the maxim can be applied: 
Presumptively a court of equity has the power to effectuate the purposes of a 
statute by maintaining the status quo where necessary. If the party seeking relief 
will suffer irreparable harm of a sort which it is the purpose of the statute to 
avoid, there is a prima fade case for relief pendente lite. It should require clear 
statutory language to find a purpose to exclude the judicial powers traditionally 
available for such purposes. 
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 685 (1965). See the dissent of Mr. 
Justice Fortas in Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 615-18, where he argues that Congress did 
not intend to give to the FTC by implication what it had given to private parties and 
the Justice Department by express grant. 
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tween 1956 and the decision in Dean Foods, the FTC had supported 
a number of legislative proposals which would have given it express 
authority temporarily to enjoin proposed mergers, but none of the 
proposals had been adopted by Congress.34 Arguably, this fact indi-
cates that even the FTC believed it lacked power to seek preliminary 
relief, absent express statutory authorization, and, in addition, that 
Congress was reluctant to confer the requested power. 
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, dismissed these 
possible objections and adopted the FTC's argument that without 
this power there would be a gap in its enforcement authority. The 
Court stated that "it would stultify Congressional purpose to say 
that the Commission did not have this incidental power to ask 
Courts of Appeal to exercise their authority under the All Writs 
Act."35 Further, the Court examined legislative history and con-
cluded that it did not evidence congressional disapproval of FTC 
authority to seek preliminary relief from a court of appeals.36 Thus, 
although this power had not been delegated directly to the FTC, the 
34. The bills were proposed to clarify the FTC's power to seek injunctive relief 
and to confirm such authority through specific legislative authorization, thus avoiding 
any implication that the FTC did not in fact have such power. See S. REP. No. 2817, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1956): 
Effective enforcement of Section 7 requires that ... the Federal Trade Commission 
have clear authority to seek court action to enjoin mergers of questionable legality 
prior to their consummation .... The FTC ... has no such authority. 
(emphasis added); Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, at 29 (1956): "The Commission should have 
specific legislative authority granting it the right to seek and obtain injunctions upon 
proper showing •... " (emphasis added). See generally 384 U.S. at 636-40 (appendix 
to dissent). 
35. 384 U.S. at 606. 
36. For the Court's reaction to congressional failure to act on the FTC's proposals, 
see 384 U.S. at 609-12. 
The legislative history of the Clayton Act is noticeably devoid of exact delineation 
of those powers available to the FTC. See Arrow-Hart &: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 
291 U.S. 587, 606 (1934), where Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Brandeis and 
Cardozo stated, in their dissent, that it should not "be said that the purpose of the 
[Clayton Act] must be defeated because the law-makers did not attempt to provide 
with a meticulous precision how the Commission should proceed in every contingency 
that might arise." Similarly, some recent cases suggest that a federal court may take 
any reasonable action necessary to insure the proper administration of the functions 
with which an administrative agency has been entrusted. Public Utilities Comm'n v. 
Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. 
Atlantic &: Gulf-Panama Canal Zone, 241 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see 79 
HARV. L. REV. 391, 402-04 (1965); cf. J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
Furthermore, in some situations where Congress has desired to deny access to the 
courts, it has done so in express terms. See, e.g., Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern 
Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 673 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. 
United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), overruled on other grounds, Nye v. United States, 
313 U.S. 33 (1941); INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 7421; Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 u.s.c. 
§§ 101-15 (1964); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. But see 
Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 257 F.2d 229, 230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1958); cf. United States v. 
E. I. DuPont de Nemours &: Co., 366 U.S. 316, 328 (1961). But cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, 
Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Trans-Pacific Freight Conf. 
v. Federal Maritime Bd., 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
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Court decided that it was necessary for the effective performance of 
the FTC's duties and, not having been expressly denied, it should 
be treated as an ancillary power granted by implication.37 
On the basis of policy, the majority's result does at first glance 
seem consistent with the general aim of section 7 of the Clayton Act 
-to arrest anti-competitive mergers in their incipiency38-and of 
section 5 of the FTC Act-to prevent unfair competition.39 Cer-
tainly, divestiture alone had proved to be an inadequate remedy.40 
Moreover, it can reasonably be argued that the drafters of this 
legislation meant only to spell out specific areas of FTC concern, 
and not to enumerate the particular remedial procedures that the 
FTC could use to prevent the proscribed conduct.41 In fact, the 
Supreme Court had previously conceded that an extensive array of 
implied enforcement powers were available to the FTC.42 Given 
37. 384 U.S. at 607-08. 
38. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4296 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE 
To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 7 (1955). 
39. The FTC's authority to prevent the paralyzing effects of unlawful mergers 
would, in this context, be based on its authority to deal with "unfair methods of 
competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). See generally FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957); FTC v. Cooper, 1962 Trade Cas. ~ 70,353 
(S.D.N.Y.); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176 
(1955); Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 
500 (1964); cf. Duke, Scope of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 63 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1192 (1963). 
40. See Duke, note 39 supra; Zimmerman, note 39 supra; Divestiture Problems in 
Merger Cases, BNA ANTITRUST &: TRADE REG. REP. No. 196, at B-1 (April 13, 1965); 
Comment, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1583-97 (1966); 
note 10 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Chrysler Corp., 1964 
Trade Cas. ~ 71,207 (D.N.J.). 
Consonant with the broad view of the remedial powers available to it under § 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act [United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 
U.S. 321 (1963)], the FTC's recent stand is that it has broad equitable powers under 
§ 11 of the Clayton Act. See Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE 
REG. REP. ~ 17,398, at 22,606 (FTC 1965); Freuhauf Trailer Co., [1965-1967 Transfer 
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 17,292 (FTC 1965); Ekco Prods. Co., 1965 TRADE REG. 
REP. ~ 71,487 (FTC 1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). In formulating a remedy 
in Ekco, supra, the FTC stated: 
This is not to say that the Commission is, in all respects, a "court of equity." 
One difference between the Commission's powers under section 11 and the powers 
of the Federal District Courts under section 15 may be that the courts, by virtue 
of their express authority "to prevent and restrain violations" of the Clayton Act, 
but not the Commission, can enjoin a merger in advance of consummation. 
Id. n.10. 
41. See 51 CONG, REc. 14,090-16,144 (1914); Henderson, supra note 3, at 36-40; Mac-
Intyre, The Federal Trade Commission After 50 Years, 1964 TRADE REG. REP. 61, 
103-04. See also note 36 supra. 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); cf. 
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 
(1946). For the FTC's view of its own powers under § 11, see Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-
1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 17,398 (FTC 1965); Freuhauf Trailer Co., 
[1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 17,292 (FTC 1965). For a view of the 
role originally contemplated for the FTC, see HENDERSON, supra note 3, at 21-27. 
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these considerations, a decision barring the FTC-a governmental 
body which was expressly designated to administer merger violations 
and which presumably acts in accordance with its expert view of the 
public good-from seeking preliminary relief in the courts, while 
any private litigant claiming to be injured can do so if it suits his 
private interests, would seem anomalous.43 
As noted earlier, the statutory basis of the Court's decision was 
neither the Clayton Act nor the FTC Act, which the court also 
found to be silent on the matter,44 but rather the All Writs Act, 
which provides: 
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress 
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.45 
Since its creation the FTC has gradually accepted increasing responsibility for enforce-
ment of the Clayton Act. See 51 CONG. R.Ec. 11,083-2,146 (1914); MacIntyre, note 41 
supra. In fact, it has been stated that the FTC was intended from the beginning to 
be the body primarily responsible for the administration of the Clayton Act. Elman, 
Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV, L. 
REv. 385 (1964). But see HENDERSON, supra note 3. In fact, as of November 8, 1962, 
the FTC had brought forty-six suits under § 7 of the Clayton Act while the Depart-
ment of Justice had only brought sixty. STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL 
BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., MERGERS AND SuPERCONCENTRATION 271-72 (Comm. Print 
1962). 
43. But see 384 U.S. at 618-19, where Mr. Justice Fortas states that the FTC's 
expertise was intended to be used to bring "to bear upon the complex economic prob-
lems of a merger .•. judgment and experience which can emerge only from careful 
factual inquiry, the taking of evidence and the formulation of a report. The Federal 
Trade Commission was not intended to be a gun, a carbon copy of the Department of 
Justice." 
44. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
45. 28 U.S.C. § I65l(a) (1964). This statute provides the clearest source of power 
for a federal appellate court desiring to grant injunctive relief. In re Philadelphia 
& Reading Coal &: Iron Co., 103 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1939). See also Armstrong v. Board 
of Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963); cf. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 246 
(1932) ("the issue of the writ may rest upon the ultimate power which we have to 
review the case •... "); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910). 
Further statutory authority may be found in § 10 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act which provides: 
Upon such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent 
irreparable injury, every reviewing court (including every court to which a case 
may be taken on appeal from or upon application for certiorari or other writ to a 
reviewing court) is authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate process to 
postpone the effective date of any agency action or preserve status or rights 
pending conclusion of the review proceedings. 
5 U.S.C. § 1009(d) (1964). Courts have held that the power conferred by this section 
may also be extended to a potential reviewing court. E.g., Long Beach Fed'l Sav. &: 
Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Cal. 1960). 
Both the courts of appeals and the United States Supreme Court also have inherent 
equity power to stay administrative orders. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio Inc. v. FCC, 
316 U.S. 4, 9-10 (1942); Drath v. FTC (D.C. Cir. 1956) (no opinion), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 
917 (1956); cf. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (affirming 
power of district court to issue injunction pendente lite pending determination of 
income tax suit on the merits); SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co., 324 U.S. 837 (1945) 
(enjoining consummation of recapitulation plan pending review of court of appeals' 
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Courts differ as to the degree of necessity they require before issuing 
a writ pursuant to this authorization. Some issue such writs when to 
do so serves to make their exercise of jurisdiction more efjective;46 
others only grant this relief when their jurisdiction would othenvise 
be defeated.41 In Dean Foods, the Supreme Court apparently did not 
adopt the latter view, since if the FTC were not allowed to seek 
preliminary relief, the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in any 
given case would not necessarily be defeated. It would always remain 
possible, even if unlikely, that the FTC might be able to fashion an 
effective order of divestiture. However, by admitting that an applica-
tion for a preliminary injunction pending FTC hearings is appro-
priate under the All Writs Act, the Supreme Court necessarily 
acknowledged that the factual situation presented by a proposed 
merger is one that can at least threaten the jurisdiction of a federal 
circuit court. The theory behind this conclusion is fairly simple. If 
a merger is consummated before the FTC can complete its adjudi-
cation, then a res in custodia legis may be destroyed-the corporate 
structures in existence prior to the merger may be lost beyond 
reconstruction.48 The FTC may thereby be prevented from framing 
decision affirming district court's denial of injunction); Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank 
8: Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. Is. 8: Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935) ("The power to 
issue an injunction when necessary to prevent the defeat or impairment of its juris-
diction is ••• inherent ••• in a court of equity.'); FED. R. C1v. P. 62(g). 
46. Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
340 U.S. 883 (1950). See also Whitney Nat'! Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 
379 U.S. 411 (1965); La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Pfaus v. Feder, 
88 N.J. Super. 468, 212 A.2d 690 (Super. Ct. 1965); cf. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 
280 Fed. 45 (1922). 
47. FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); cf., 
In re Chappell, 201 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1953); Avon Dairy Co. v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp. 
500 (N.D. Ohio 1946). 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70,419 (preliminary 
injunction issued), afj'd, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,243 (E.D. Mo.) (divestiture ordered); 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,131 (N.D. Cal.) (preliminary 
injunction denied), held no violation, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,215 (N.D. Cal.). But see 
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 11 69,698 (S.D. Cal.), held no 
violation, 233 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Cal. 1964), reversed, 384 U.S. 270 (1966). In fact, 
the denial of an injunction has, on occasion, caused the discontinuance of a govern-
ment suit, it being felt that not even a final divestiture order could restore effective 
competition. E.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963), 
appellate juris. denied, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963), afj'd, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963); United 
States v. Gimbel Bros., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962). See also 1964 BNA ANTITRUsr 
& TRADE REG. REP. No. 180, at B-2. 
In a large number of cases a final determination on the merits has been avoided 
because agreements to merge have been terminated upon the granting of preliminary 
relief. E.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United 
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Corp., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), a[fd, 320 F.2d 
509 (3d Cir. 1963), consent decree, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,074 (W.D. Pa.); United States 
v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 11 71,659 (W.D. Pa. 1965); United States v. Parents 
Magazine Enterprises, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 11 70,437 (N.D. Ill.), 1963 Trade Cas. 
11 70,649 (N.D. Ill.). See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,131 
(N.D. Cal.), complaint dismissed, 1964 Trade Cas. 11 71,215 (N.D. Cal.); Note, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 391, 400 (1965). See also notes 10 8: 40 supra. 
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an effective order, and the circuit court deprived of the opportunity 
to enforce such an order. On this ground, the Supreme Court in-
voked the All Writs Act. 
That the All Writs Act might be used to confer this power on 
the FTC was not a novel idea when the Supreme Court adopted it. 
In the only two cases close to being on point with Dean Foods, the 
Second and Ninth Circuits differed on the question of whether they 
were authorized under the All Writs Act to grant temporary injunc-
tions pending the outcome of administrative hearings examining 
the legality of a proposed merger. In Board of Governors v. Trans-
america Corp.,49 the Ninth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction 
preventing the respondent corporation from acquiring the assets of 
certain banks until the administrative agency could determine 
whether the acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. Since 
the agency was without any statutory authority to protect its own 
jurisdiction, the court reasoned that it (the court) had authority 
under the All Writs Act to issue an injunction pendente lite in 
order to "prevent frustration of the ultimate exercise of its jurisdic-
tion even before an appealable or reviewable order has been entered 
•••• "
50 Six years later, the Second Circuit, in FTC v. International 
Paper Co.,51 denied the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction 
in a similar case. The court emphasized that it was improper to use 
the All Writs Act as a basis for granting the injunction because the 
"pattern of enforcement adopted by the Congress in the Clayton Act 
makes clear that the Commission was not intended to have such 
authority .... "52 The Supreme Court in Dean Foods, clearly re-
jected the Second Circuit's position on this question. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEAN FOODS 
The Supreme Court's conclusion that logic and policy support 
giving the FTC a power which it needs to carry out the mandate of 
the Clayton Act loses some of its attractiveness under the weight of 
practical considerations which suggest that the courts of appeals may 
49. 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950), cited with approval 
in Whitney Nat'! Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Pfaus 
v. Feder, 88 N.J. Super. 468, 212 A.2d 690 (Super. Ct. 1965). 
It is significant that since the Third Circuit set aside the FTC's order of divestiture 
in 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953), the Ninth Circuit never 
actually invoked the All "\Vrits Statute in aid of its own jurisdiction. 
50. 184 F.2d at 315. The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Transamerica and Dean Foods 
could easily have been distinguished on their facts, for in Transamerica the agency 
could not have ordered divestiture after the planned acquisition. The power to require 
divestiture of acquired assets as well as stock was not conferred upon the FTC until 
1950. 15 U.S.C. § 2l(b) (1964). Thus, in Transamerica the merger would have absolutely 
defeated the jurisdiction of the agency. This was not the case in Dean Foods; in fact, 
the Dean Foods case was closer to International Paper which dealt with acquired 
stock. See note 51 infra. 
51. 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956). 
52. Id. at 373. 
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be an unsuitable forum for hearing these petitions for preliminary 
relief. It is submitted that only if close limits are imposed upon 
the FTC's use of this power, which is at present ill defined, will it 
prove useful in effectuating the purposes of the Clayton Act. The 
third part of this Comment will discuss some of the implications and 
difficulties which follow from the Dean Foods decision, and will 
explain why and how the decision should be limited. 
A. Standards 
The availability of preliminary and final relief for violations of 
section 7 are closely related. As noted earlier, unless companies are 
temporarily prevented from merging pending FTC adjudication 
of the legality of the merger arrangement, fully effective final relief 
by divestiture may prove impossible. However, since mergers are a 
commonplace business phenomenon, if clear and reliable criteria 
are not established for determining what acquisitions should be pre-
liminarily enjoined, many mergers will be "subjected to paralyzing 
uncertainties for years, to the detriment of effective planning and 
vigorous exploitation of the possibilities of the merged company."53 
Moreover, it is inevitable that the strictness of the test adopted will 
have a great effect upon the number of petitions for injunctions 
brought before the courts of appeals, and ultimately upon the 
effectiveness of enforcement of section 7 by the FTC. Thus, one 
very important question raised by Dean Foods is what standard 
should the courts of appeals apply in ruling on FTC requests for 
preliminary injunctions. 
The most natural, and seemingly simple, approach to this prob-
lem would be to adopt the same procedural standard employed by 
the district courts in reviewing Justice Department petitions for 
temporary injunctions.54 Presumably, this is the same standard that 
the courts would apply to petitions by private individuals.55 How-
53. Edwards, Tests of Probable Effect Under the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 
369 (1964). 
54. The use of preliminary injunctions may well be confined to those cases in 
which illegality is reasonably clear. See Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predict-
ability in the Application of the .Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613 (1965). The follow-
ing cases have required a prima facie showing of illegality: United States v. Chrysler 
Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 655-56 (D.N.J. 1964) (preliminary injunction granted); United 
States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (denying a pre-
liminary motion whereby the Government sought for the first time to obtain an 
injunction against a conglomerate merger); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 
817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963). 
55. Private parties have obtained injunctions barring violations of § 7 of the 
Clayton Act, but the cases have typically involved situations wherein one corporation 
attempts to prevent another from purchasing its stock on the market, or to prevent 
it from voting such stock. See, e.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf &: Western 
Industries, Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1964); Crane Co. v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 280 F.2d 
747 (6th Cir. 1960); Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956). 
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ever, the various district courts in passing on Justice Department 
petitions for injunctive relief have not adopted any uniform stan-
dard. Some courts grant preliminary relief if the petitioner raises 
"serious and substantial questions" about the merits of the merger; 56 
others apply a stricter test and require a showing that it is reason-
ably probable that the petitioner will win on the merits in a full 
trial; 57 still others demand that the petitioner demonstrate a clear 
probability of final success.58 
In practice, which one of these possible standards is ultimately 
adopted may not prove too significant. The Supreme Court's recent 
decision in United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,50 so expands the 
potential substantive coverage of section 7 that virtually any hori-
zontal merger which the FTC chooses to attack may require pre-
liminary restraint under all of the tests suggested above. In Von's 
Grocery, the Supreme Court found that a merger between two local 
retailers whose total grocery sales comprised 7.5% of the total 
dollars of retail sales in the relevant market violated section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, primarily because the merger occurred in a market 
which was undergoing a threatening trend toward concentration. 
When the Seventh Circuit heard the Dean Foods case on remand, 
the FTC, basing its position on the Von's Grocery decision, argued 
as follows: (1) where there is a trend toward fewer and fewer dairies 
and a merger occurs between two leading companies, a presumption 
arises that the effect of the merger will be substantially to lessen 
competition; and (2) such a showing constitutes sufficient grounds 
for issuing a preliminary in junction. 60 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the FTC that, in the light of 
Von's Grocery, it was reasonably probable that the FTC would find 
the merger in violation of section 7, 61 and it found that this was 
No case has been found in which a private party obtained an injunction against 
a merger of the type at issue in Dean Foods. 
56. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), 
affd, 206 F.2d 738 {2d Cir. 1953); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 1956 Trade Cas. 
,r 68,244 (E.D. Mo.), plenary judgment granted, 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
57. See Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 182 (E.D. Mich. 1960); 
United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. ,r 71,366 (D.N.J.). 
58. See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal.), appel-
late jurisdiction denied, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), aff d, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963). 
59. 384 U.S. 270 (1964). 
60. It is noteworthy that the dairy industry has been described as the "most 
merger-prone industry." STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87th CONG., 
2D SESS., REPORT ON MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION 26 (Comm. Print. 1962). The size 
of the two dairies contemplating merger in Dean Foods is discussed at note 14 supra. 
61. 347 F.2d 745, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1965). As a result of the merger, Dean Dairy Co. 
would have controlled about 23% of the packaged milk market. This percentage, 
coupled with the concentration of the industry and the relevant market in the Chi-
cago area, indicate that the merger might well have violated § 7 of the Clayton Act. 
Papers, note 14 supra. Dean Foods Co., however, has consistently urged that the 
reselling of Bowman's home delivery business to smaller dairies following the acquisi-
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enough to warrant granting the requested relief. 62 This reliance on 
Von's Grocery indicates that in granting preliminary relief the 
court used a different substantive standard than that which the 
Supreme Court had previously laid dmvn in United States v. Phila-
delphia National Bank.63 There, in ruling on a Department of 
Justice suit for injunctive relief, the Court had stated: 
A merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage 
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in 
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to 
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the 
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to 
have such anti-competitive effects.64 
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of this standard in favor of the one 
applied in Von's Grocery reflects a trend in section 7 litigation; the 
courts are now demanding less and less proof of concentration or 
anti-competitive effect before proscribing mergers under section 7.65 
As a result of this development, it may well become a moot question 
whether the FTC need show a "serious and substantial" question, or 
a reasonable probability of a violation, or a clear probability of final 
success. 
To determine whether or not Von's Grocery is precedent for 
finding a violation in the context of the Dean Foods merger would 
involve a complicated analysis of the facts of the Von's Grocery case 
and speculation as to what the Court intended the breadth of its 
holding in Von's to be. This is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Still, regardless of the substantive standard applied, the Seventh 
Circuit's order granting temporary relief presents a problem as to 
the procedural standard to apply. The court framed the preliminary 
injunction issue not in terms of finding a reasonable probability that 
the FTC would ultimately win on the merits, but rather of finding 
a reasonable probability that the FTC would find a violation.66 
tion, thus dispersing a large percentage of that business among a great many smaller 
firms and making entry by other small firms into the market more attractive, has 
revitalized smaller dairies in the Chicago market. See, e.g., Answering Brief of Respon-
dent Before Federal Trade Commission at 33-36 (Oct. 24, 1966). 
62. The court granted the injunction on the basis of a showing that it was "reason-
ably probable that the purchase agreement ... between Dean and Bowman may be 
determined by the Federal Trade Commission to be in violation of section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 and section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l)." Order granting petition for preliminary injunction, No. 15,493, at 
2-3 (Slip Opinion, July 18, 1966). See note 22 supra. Compare the standards adopted by 
the district courts in ruling on government motions for preliminary injunctions in notes 
56-60 supra. 
63. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
64. Id. at 363. 
65. See THE SUPREME COURT, 1965 TERM, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 245 (1966). 
66. See note 61 supra. 
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At first glance, the very fact that the FTC is seeking the injunction 
would appear to satisfy this test. In fact, one member of the FTC, 
in dissenting from the holding that the Dean-Bowman merger was 
illegal, vigorously maintained that some of the FTC's remarks be-
fore the court of appeals during argument on the petition for tem-
porary relief impaired the integrity of the FTC's adjudicatory func-
tion and thereby rendered it an unsuitable forum for a later hearing 
on the merits. 67 
This problem of FTC prejudice which is raised by the Seventh 
Circuit's test is one which Congress attempted to meet in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act by protecting the adjudicative function 
of agencies from prosecutorial contamination.68 The courts, too, 
have demonstrated concern when the functions of investigator, 
prosecutor, and adjudicator are rolled into one.69 However, since 
these functions are in practice performed by different divisions 
within the FTC,70 it is submitted that this allocation effectuates such 
internal separation of duties that the danger of prejudice is kept to 
a minimum. 71 
67. See note 25 supra. The "appearance of justice" standard which the ITC is 
required to maintain may be violated if its actions border on prosecution. See Texaco, 
Inc. v. ITC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964); American Cyanamid Co. v. ITC, 1966 
Trade Cas. ,r 71,807 (6th Cir. 1966). See also Motion and Supporting Memorandum 
of Respondent Dean Foods Co. for An Order Dismissing The Appeal [to the Full 
Federal Trade Commission] and Allowing The Initial Decision to Become the De-
cision of the Commission, FTC Doc. No. 8674, at 10 (1966). 
68. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 5(c), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1964). The 
separation of functions theory is discussed generally in 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
1f 13.01-.11 (1958). 
69. E.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41-49 (1950). 
70. See organization chart of the ITC, 3 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,039, at 9556. 
71. See 8 B.C. COMM. &: IND. L. REv. 360, 366-67 (1966): 
The Commission has a separate office of hearing examiners whose members are 
involved in neither the investigating nor prosecuting activities of the Commission. 
It is their duty to conduct "fair and impartial" hearings on the merits of a case. 
Under the Commission's rules of procedure, a party to an ITC action may file a 
motion seeking removal of an examiner believed to be biased. There has appar-
ently been no procedure yet established for exercising the Commission's new power 
to seek preliminary relief. Under the Commission's present organization, the most 
logical office to file a petition for preliminary relief would be the office of the Gen-
eral Counsel. This office presently defends the Commission's decisions in the courts 
of appeal. If the ITC's new power is administered in this way, there should at 
least be no personal involvement on the part of the hearing officers in a petition 
for a temporary injunction brought before the court of appeals. In any event, it 
should be no more difficult for the Commission to make an objective decision 
after a preliminary injunction has been granted than it is for a district court to 
do so. 
In this regard it is interesting to compare the procedures of the NLRB, which has 
statutory power to seek preliminary relief under § IOG) of the National Labor Relations 
Act. The Board, in turn, has delegated this responsibility to the agency's regional 
directors. 29 C.F.R. § 101.37 (1967). They, however, are under the direct supervision of 
the agency's general counsel [29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1966)], and thus for practical purposes 
the delegation is to the general counsel. This delegation of § IOG) powers was upheld in 
Evans v. International Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ind. 1948). It is sug-
gested that this more explicit differentiation of functions, which has proven highly ad-
vantageous in the NLRB context, might well be copied by the FTC. The FTC could 
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A further problem is evidenced by the proceedings before the 
Seventh Circuit. Although the court verbalized a test based on the 
reasonable probability that the FTC would find a violation, it ap-
pears that it did not give serious attention to the facts upon which 
the FTC would have to rely in order to make such a finding. Indeed, 
it appears that the Seventh Circuit believed that it was under a 
mandate from the Supreme Court to enter the injunction, regard-
less of the merits. The court, on remand, examined no evidence 
other than the affidavits and summaries of factual evidence which 
were submitted by the parties to the proceeding; it did not even 
consider a summary of the record of the FTC hearing, which by 
chance happened to be completed prior to the proceedings in the 
court,72 when that record was made available to it. Given the factual 
complexity of merger litigation, the time pressures of a busy court 
calendar, and the court's lack of experience in holding original 
hearings for injunctive relief, this failure thoroughly to investigate 
the facts may not be surprising, but the Seventh Circuit's experience 
indicates that the courts of appeals would have trouble applying 
even a uniform standard in a consistent fashion. 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's reliance on the All 
Writs Act, and its emphasis on the fact that consummated mergers 
often prevent the subsequent entry of effective orders, require that 
all FTC requests for injunctive relief should be carefully assessed 
against the strict standard that the injunction be "reasonably neces-
sary" or "urgently necessary" to preserve the divestiture remedy.73 
More particularly, it is recommended that the courts of appeals 
impose the following requirements on the FTC in temporary in-
junction cases: (I) the petition should be filed immediately upon 
notice of the proposed merger; 74 (2) the FTC should present evi-
expressly delegate responsibility for seeking preliminary relief to its General Counsel, 
and, although such delegation would only confirm the natural FTC practice, such a 
straightforward recognition and solution of the prejudice problem would seem ad-
vantageous. 
Another possible way of separating the FTC's adjudicatory function from its inves-
tigatory and prosecutory functions would be through the creation of a trade court. The 
tax courts provide an obvious precedent. See Kintner, The Trade Court, The ABA, 
the Lawyer and the Public Interest, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION PROCEEDINGS 72 (1957); 
Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions From Federal Trade Commission to a Trade 
Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REV. 199 (1960). 
72. The fact that the hearing before the examiner had been completed before 
the court of appeals considered the petition for the prliminary injunction was 
fortuitous. That the court refused to consider the record of that hearing, and instead 
requested the parties to submit their own factual summaries, may indicate a refusal 
to undertake a thoroughgoing factual investigation, and without such an investigation, 
the proper application of standards is impossible. 
73. See notes 105-10, & 113 infra and accompanying text. 
74. In Dean Foods such petition was filed on December 30, 1965, seventeen days 
after the agreement to merge had been reached, and eight days after the FTC had 
filed its complaint against respondents. Cf. Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 1957 Trade 
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dence sufficient to demonstrate the likelihood both that the merger 
would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, and that consummation 
of the merger would present a real obstacle to divestiture, if that 
remedy proved necessary;75 and (3) the FTC should show that ir-
reparable harm to the public interest would result if the merger 
were not halted pendente lite.76 Even if these recommendations 
were to be accepted, there remains to be considered the host of pro-
cedural difficulties which result from having courts of appeals sit 
as trial courts. 
B. Procedure 
The greatest and most obvious difficulty ansmg from the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Dean Foods is that the decision places a 
court of appeals in a position where it must sit as a court of original 
jurisdiction and, perhaps, engage in complex fact-finding determina-
tions-a task for which it has neither the "facilities nor the institu-
tional aptitude."77 Unless it is true that the substantive test to be 
applied in merger cases is now so broad that virtually any horizontal 
merger violates section 7,78 preliminary hearings for injunctive relief 
can be expected to assume "all the essentials of a trial on the 
merits,"79 since the court will have to determine the probable com-
petitive effects of a merger which will require making an extended 
factual examination of the relevant product and geographical mar-
kets. 80 The courts of appeals should not perform this function on 
Cas. 'il 68,858 (S.D.N.Y.) (preliminary injunctive relief to prevent commingling of 
assets denied where directors did not act promptly after learning of the intended 
acquisition, but stood by while the acquisition was completed). 
75. Ordinarily, both elements of a government suit-probable injury to competi-
tion and the likelihood of ineffective divestiture-will have to be shown before a 
temporary injunction will issue. E.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 1956 
Trade Cas. 'i! 68,479 (S.D.N.Y.). 
76. Cf. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Note, 
79 HARV. L. R.Ev. 391, 393 (1965); see notes 10 & 41 supra. 
77. 384 U.S. at 630. 
78. See text accompanying note 65 supra. 
79. United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963), appeal 
dismissed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963), application for preliminary injunction denied, 
84 S. Ct. 4 (1963). 
80. It is frequently said that a definitive resolution of inquiries into "probable 
competitive effect," "line of commerce" and "section of the country" lies particularly 
with the office of the FTC. See, e.g., Elman, supra note 54, at 624: 
[T]o determine the probable competitive effects of a merger is very often not 
possible without an extended factual inquiry .... 
Before a merger's legal status can be determined, it is necessary to understand 
the market and industry setting of the merger. This requires an economic study. 
The Commission's staff of economists and statisticians, with the aid of compulsory 
process, where necessary, should be able to conduct such studies; and a staff eco-
nomic study and report would normally be the first step in the fact-finding process 
See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 631 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (factual 
economic questions about "line of commerce," "section of the country" and probable 
effect upon competition are ones "committed in the first instance to the FTC and not 
to the courts."); cf. Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 397 U.S. 411, 421 (1965); 
Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946). 
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the basis of affidavits alone. A summary judgment may be permis-
sible when application is made for a stay pending appeal from a 
district court ruling a/ ter the district court has already heard evi-
dence at a full trial, 81 but to allow courts to enter preliminary in-
junctions for violations of section 7 on only the basis of affidavits 
would seemingly invite "justice which is rough and ready, to say 
the least."82 Moreover, not only should parties be allowed to present 
evidence at hearings on preliminary injunctions, but experience 
shows that in its applications for preliminary relief the Department 
of Justice has tended to present all the evidence then available to 
it.83 Obviously, requiring an appellate court to engage in such a 
complete factual examination raises a number of problems. Hereto-
fore, courts of appeals acquired jurisdiction in section 7 cases only 
to review a certified transcript of completed FTC proceedings.84 
And, this review was limited, since FTC orders could only be over-
turned if not supported by substantial evidence. In disposing of 
requests for preliminary relief, the courts will usually have no 
record,85 and whatever standard is applied the question they face 
should require a closer analysis of the evidence than is necessary in 
deciding whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the 
FTC's result. Moreover, further problems arise because the federal 
appellate courts lack any statute or rules governing venue, service 
81. While applications to a court of appeals for a stay pending appeal from a 
ruling by a district court may result in the resolution of factual issues on the presenta-
tion of affidavits [Dunn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n., 299 F.2d 873, 874 (6th Cir. 
1962)], the district court is generally required to hear the evidence in the actual 
application for temporary relief. See 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.04, at 1638-39: 
On the hearing for the [preliminary] injunction an adequate presentation of 
the facts is necessary. • . • The court should normally be reluctant to decide 
controverted issues in favor of the movant on the basis of affidavits alone. 
For examples of the extensive presentation of evidence which frequently occurs, see 
United States v. Penick &: Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965) (6 witnesses called 
by Government to testify on alleged impact of reciprocity in the starch industry); 
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), afj'd, 320 F.2d 
509 (3d Cir. 1963) (5 day hearing); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 
,r 71,659 (W .D. Pa. 1965) (6 day hearing). See also Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 391, 400 
(1965). Where factual antitrust issues have been presented, however, summary judg-
ment has been held inappropriate in many cases. See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, 
Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). 
82. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 632 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Penick &: Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965); 
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963); United States 
v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 
Trade Cas. ,r 71,659 (W .D. Pa. 1965). 
84. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). See FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 
(2d Cir. 1956); cf. FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); In re NLRB, 
304 U.S. 486 (1938). It is also worth noting that 15 U.S.C. § 2I(c) (1964) expressly 
provides that the court of appeals "shall have power • . • to issue such writs as are 
ancillary to its jurisdiction or are necessary in its judgment to prevent injury to the 
public or to competitors pendente lite." 
85. In Dean Foods, although a record was available, the court failed to give it 
consideration. See note 72 supra. 
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of process, subpoena power, 86 discovery power, or admissibility of 
evidence.87 These procedural shortcomings were summarily noted 
by Justice Fortas in his dissent in Dean Foods,88 and the Seventh 
Circuit's confusion on remand demonstrated the correctness of his 
views. 
One way that courts of appeals may be expected to try to avoid 
being swamped by the factual complexity of section 7 cases is to 
refer the fact-finding duties to a master or referee,89 or perhaps even 
to the FTC itself as a special referee, since the FTC is supposedly 
expert in merger problems. If reference to the FTC should become 
the standard practice, it would make sense for the FTC to conduct 
its fact-finding hearings before it files its request for a preliminary 
injunction with the circuit court. Under this procedure, if the FTC 
86. For comparable rules governing district courts, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 22-23 (1964). 
For a brief discussion of the procedure followed in fact-finding hearings on motions 
for preliminary injunctions in the federal courts, see Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771, 773 
(1965). 
87. The problem of adopting appropriate rules of evidence in hearings for pre· 
liminary relief from alleged violations of § 7 merits special consideration. Generally, 
rules of admissibility appear to be more relaxed in administrative proceedings than 
in judicial proceedings. The FTC standard is that "[r]elevant, material, and reliable 
evidence shall be admitted. Irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable and unduly repetitious 
evidence shall be excluded." 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1967). If the court of appeals is trying to 
determine whether it is "reasonably probable" that the FTC will find a violation (as 
the Seventh Circuit envisioned its role), it would seem that the court should consider 
whatever evidence the FTC would subsequently consider; it should not limit itself 
by the more stringent judicial rules, for only by considering the same evidence as 
the FTC will subsequently admit can a court make a sound judgment as to what 
action the FTC is likely to take. Even if the court of appeals is trying to decide 
whether the requested relief is reasonably, or urgently, necessary (as recommended 
by this Comment), it would seem that the rules of evidence governing the prelim-
inary proceeding in the court of appeals should still be those which will govern the 
subsequent FTC hearing for otherwise the court might find itself excluding evidence 
upon which the FTC would later rely in finding a violation necessitating remedial 
action. 
It may be, however, that the question raised in this footnote is moot, for it has been 
said that FTC hearing examiners "give very stringent effect to the rules which govern 
non-jury cases in the federal courts." If this is true, it would make no difference 
whether the court is nominally applying judicial or agency rules, and it would seem 
that the FTC might well revise its regulations to conform with its actual practice. 
Compare the regulations governing evidence in NLRB hearings: "Any proceeding shall, 
so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable 
in the District Courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure • . . .'' 
29 C.F.R. § 102.39 (1967). 
88. 384 U.S. at 634-35. 
89. This ploy is open to the objection that in so doing the courts of appeals would 
be abdicating their judicial function and thus depriving the parties of their right to 
trial before a court. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1956), where the 
Supreme Court upheld a circuit court writ of mandamus requiring a district court 
judge to vacate orders referring an antitrust matter to a master. The La Buy case, 
however, is arguably distinguishable from the Dean Foods situation in that La Buy 
involved a master making findings on the merits of a case, not simply on the question 
of preliminary relief. 
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files its findings of fact along with its request for preliminary relief, 
the court of appeals can grant or deny a preliminary injunction 
without further factual hearings. Such a procedure is not entirely 
without precedent, for in a somewhat analogous context-the en-
forcement of cease and desist orders prior to 1959 under section 11 
of the Clayton Act00-the FTC was allowed to conduct hearings on 
order violations before seeking judicial enforcement. 91 While the 
hearings in the cease and desist order cases have been criticized as 
unduly long and cumbersome,92 part of the explanation for their 
duration and complexity is that the FTC conducted adjudicatory 
hearings, although the Administrative Procedure Act provides that 
such formal hearings are not required in "cases in which an agency 
acts as an agent for a court."93 Since in the section 7 context the FTC 
would be acting as the court's agent if appointed master, and would 
presumably be interested in an expeditious handling of the pre-
liminary matter so that it could proceed to the merits of the merger 
as quickly as possible, the problem of delay might be avoided. How-
ever, it is suggested that the FTC's findings in the preliminary hear-
ings may well be reflected in its conclusion on the ultimate legality 
of the merger, and if this is the case, the defendant corporations, 
despite the Administrative Procedure Act, should be entitled to the 
more elaborate processes connected with adjudicatory hearings. 
If the courts of appeals do adopt the practice of using the FTC 
as a master to avoid burdensome fact-finding chores, and if the 
FTC holds pre-filing hearings on the injunction issue as would seem 
likely, then it appears that when the FTC finds facts which merit 
filing a request for a preliminary injunction, FTC victory will be 
virtually assured in a court of appeals. This being true, it would 
seem that the entire responsibility for issuing the injunction might 
as well have been vested in the FTC from the outset. This prospect, 
of course, magnifies the threat of agency prejudice discussed earlier.94 
After it has completed an adjudicatory hearing as master and de-
90. See generally Kauper, FTC v. Jantzen: Blessing, Disaster, or Tempest in a 
Teapot?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1523, 1536-40 (1966). 
91. FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510 {2d Cir. 1951). It should be noted 
that in this context there is little danger that the FTC's ruling on the order violation 
will prejudice its performance of subsequent responsibilities. Compare note 94 infra and 
accompanying text. 
92. Kauper, supra note 90. 
93. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1964). 
94. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text. The possible prejudice problem 
here is substantially greater than that discussed earlier. The danger of combining 
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions can be dissipated by internal separation of 
functions. Here, however, we are combining two different adjudicatory tasks in the 
FTC, and although different hearing examiners might be used, if an examiner's 
decision that the facts warranted a petition for preliminary relief were appealed to 
the Commissioners, they would have to draw conclusions as to the probability of a 
violation, thus influencing their later adjudication of the merger on its merits. 
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cided that the facts warrant a preliminary injunction, the FTC can 
hardly be expected to move to another hearing on the merits of the 
merger with a fully open mind. It is possible to contend that the 
possibility of prejudice here is really no greater than when courts 
which have made a prejudgment on adjudicatory facts are allowed to 
hear a case a-Second time on remand. Still, despite the advantage of 
making use of the FTC's expertise, the possibility of prejudice to-
gether with the possibility of cumbersome proceedings should bar 
the courts of appeals from turning to the FTC as a master in their 
attempt to avoid fact-finding duties. The use of other, impartial 
masters or referees, however, seems sensible. 
One alternative to the use of a master is, of course, to have the 
FTC bring its action for a preliminary injunction in a district 
court.95 However, it is doubtful whether the FTC can do so without 
express statutory authorization.96 To the extent that Dean Foods 
rests on the All Writs Act, it is no authority for the proposition that 
the action may be brought in a district court, since no threat to a 
district court's jurisdiction is involved if preliminary relief is un-
available. Yet, Dean Foods does reflect a liberal attitude toward 
allowing the FTC powers that have not been specifically granted, 
and it is conceivable that the Court might admit that the FTC does 
have standing to seek preliminary relief in a district court. This 
result would not only reduce the workload of the courts of appeals, 
but would send the proceeding to a tribunal which is more familiar 
with the fact-finding function than are the appellate courts. It should 
be noted that even the district courts might have some difficulty 
with this action since even they might find it necessary to apply 
unfamiliar FTC rules of evidence.97 
If the appellate courts do prove to be the forum to which the 
FTC resorts when it wants preliminary injunctions-and, given the 
ease with which the FTC finally obtained the injunction from the 
Seventh Circuit and the doubt which beclouds its right of access 
to the district courts, this would seem the likely result-then the 
courts of appeals are placed in a position in which they must serve 
as appellate bodies in cases which they have already heard at the trial 
level. After they have heard and weighed evidence relevant to the 
merits of a case while ruling on the petition for preliminary relief, 
if the FTC then finds a violation and issues a cease and desist order, 
the courts of appeals will have to consider any appeal from that 
order. 
It is possible that two different courts of appeals might handle 
95. Cf. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 
1954). 
96. See generally The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 258 (1966); 
8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 360, 368 (1967); 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 157, 159, 164 n.41 (1967). 
97. See note 87 supra. 
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such a case-one deciding the preliminary injunction issue and the 
other the appeal from the FTC's order. Indeed, after one court of 
appeals has ruled adversely to a defendant on the preliminary matter, 
it would seem likely that the defendant would try to have the appeal 
on the merits litigated before another circuit, provided this was 
feasible.98 This possibility raises a question as to the effect to be 
given to the findings of the first court in the later proceeding. It can 
be said that the virtues of administrative convenience, finality, and 
consistency argue for giving binding effect to the prior findings, and 
that the "law of the case" doctrine99 should be used to make the find-
ings of the first court of appeals binding upon its fellow circuit 
court. However, this position is easily criticized. First, it may be 
said that different issues are involved in the two proceedings, since 
the first hearing only requires the court to investigate the proba-
bility of a violation or irreparable harm, whereas the second requires 
the court to find substantial evidence supporting the FTC's finding 
of a violation. If this point is valid, "law of the case" cannot be in-
voked since it applies only to matters previously decided.100 How-
ever, although the issue broadly framed may be different in the two 
proceedings, some of the same questions are likely to be in dispute 
in both, and to these at least the "law of the case" might arguably 
apply. Second, the doctrine has never prevented a court from switch-
ing its own position on a given matter;101 if the same court can so 
change its mind, it is hard to see why a second equal and coordinate 
court should be denied the right to do so. Finally, the fact-finding 
role played by the court of appeals which hears the petition for pre-
liminary relief may justify viewing that court not as an appellate 
court, but rather as a de facto district court. If so, it is arguable that 
its findings should be treated as those of an inferior court, and the 
doctrine of "law of the case" would then be inapplicable. Thus, the 
better view would seem to be that the findings made by one court of 
appeals on the preliminary matter should not be binding when the 
98. This possibility is recognized by Justice Fortas who points out that § ll(c) 
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964), provides that appeal from an FTC order 
may be "in the court of appeals • . • for any circuit within which such violation 
occurred or within which such person resides or carries on business." In Dean Foods, 
review of the final FTC order might have been sought not in the Seventh Circuit, 
but rather in the Sixth or Eighth Circuits, where Dean and Bowman carried on busi-
ness. 384 U.S. 597, 624 n.12 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
99. Basically, the doctrine is that when a federal court enunciates a rule of law, 
it establishes that law which other courts owing obedience to it must, and which it 
itself normally will, apply to the same issues in subsequent proceedings in that case. 
See generally lb J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.404 (2d ed. 1965). 
100. See, e.g., Electric Research Prods. v. Gross, 120 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1941); lb 
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 0.404(1) n.14 (2d. ed. 1965). 
101. The power to re-examine questions previously determined is exercised spar-
ingly, but when a court decides that justice so requires, it may in its discretion reopen 
such questions. See, e.g., Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912); United States 
v. Fullard-Leo, 156 F.2d '756 (9th Cir. 1946). 
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FTC findings on the merits of the merger are reviewed in another 
court of appeals. 
In some cases the same court of appeals will hear both the re-
quest for the preliminary injunction and the appeal from the FTC's 
finding of a section 7 violation. While in this situation there is no 
legal obstacle to the court's changing its mind,102 the situation does 
once again raise a possible prejudice problem. It is questionable 
whether, after hearing the evidence and argument on the prelimi-
nary injunction issue, a court will still be able to rule fairly on the 
question raised on appeal of whether the FTC's finding of a viola-
tion was supported by substantial evidence. This possible source of 
bias seems less than an ovenvhelmi:qg objection to having courts of 
appeals hear requests for preliminary relief, for it would seem simple 
enough for them to assure impartiality by using a different panel of 
judges in the second proceeding. In addition, if the courts of appeals 
all grant preliminary relief almost as a matter of course, as did the 
Seventh Circuit in Dean Foods,103 then they will hardly have looked 
at the evidence in the original proceeding, and their minds should 
be quite open when they actually examine the sufficiency of the evi-
dence on appeal. Finally, since it can be contended that the court is 
faced with two different issues in the two proceedings,104 it may be 
said that its conclusion on the first need not, in fact, prejudice it on 
the second. It is suggested, however, that the latter two arguments 
are not altogether convincing, and that if the same court of appeals 
does hear both matters then a fresh panel should be used in the 
second proceeding. 
C. Orders 
The difficulties raised by the Dean Foods decision do not end 
with the problems of enunciating a proper standard for granting 
preliminary relief and establishing a proper procedure. The case 
also leaves considerable confusion as to what the terms of a prelimi-
nary order should be.105 A comparison of the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Dean Foods indicates two different, though not 
mutually exclusive, views as to the real purpose sought to be achieved 
by granting preliminary relief in a section 7 case. Justice Fortas' 
dissent suggests that a court of appeals' main concern should be 
102. Cf. note 99 supra. 
103. See note 72 supra and accompanying text. 
104. See text at note 100 supra. 
105. The Department of Justice's frequent use of preliminary relief reflects a 
diversity of orders ranging from temporary injunctions which flatly enjoin an acquisi-
tion to injunctions imposing a number of conditions designed to maintain the separa-
tion and identity of the merging companies. E.g., compare United States v. Greater 
Buffalo Press, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 'ii 70,380 (W.D.N.Y.), with United States v. Brown 
Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 'ii 68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956). 
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with preventing the detrimental effects on the economy which result 
from mergers which "tend substantially to lessen competition or 
create danger of monopoly.''106 The logical consequence of such a 
position is that the only truly effective preliminary injunction is 
one which absolutely prevents the companies from operating to-
gether until there has been a factual determination that the merger 
is legal. On the other hand, if the predominant concern in granting 
preliminary relief is, as Justice Clark speaking for the majority 
indicated,107 with giving the FTC the opportunity to enter an 
effective order of divestiture, and thus with giving the courts the 
opportunity to enforce such an order, then a court need not at this 
preliminary stage bar joint operation entirely. Instead, it can allow 
joint operation to the extent that it will not interfere with a later 
order of divestiture. 
The majority opinion offers no specific guidance as to how a 
court may condition or limit its order so that its interference with 
normal business activity will be kept to a minimum, and thus it 
leaves open several questions. First, should the proposed mergants 
be allowed to operate together during the FTC proceedings, and, 
if so, to what extent? Certainly, if joint operation is not allowed, 
companies who are not in fact in violation of section 7 are inevitably 
penalized by the order, for they must either remain in a state of 
limbo until the FTC rules on the legality of the proposed merger, 
or spend time and effort seeking other ways to accomplish the legiti-
mate ends of the merger. Second, how should the order be framed 
to minimize the dissipation of the mergants' capital and personnel 
arrangements, and prevent the companies from being so weakened 
that they are unable to proceed with the merger when the FTC 
finally reaches a determination favorable to them?108 Third, can or 
should the acquired company be forced to operate as a separate divi-
sion or a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring company, pend-
ing the FTC adjudication? 
In Dean Foods, the Seventh Circuit order read in part as follows: 
[D]uring the period of four months from the date of this order ... 
[Dean and Bowman] are enjoined from making any material 
changes, directly or indirectly, with respect to the assets purchased 
by Dean from Bowman pursuant to their agreement ... including 
the operation and policies affecting those assets ... pending entry of 
a final order.109 
106. See 384 U.S. at 618; United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 658-59 
(D.N.J. 1964). 
107. See 384 U.S. at 605·06. 
108. See note 111 infra. 
109. Order granting petition for preliminary injunction, No. 15,493, at 2 (Slip 
Opinion, July 18, 1966) (emphasis added). 
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It is clear that this order adopted the conceptual framework ap-
parently endorsed by the Supreme Court majority in Dean Foods. 
However, the possibility remains that another court of appeals may 
think that the real purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent 
all immediate effects of what may prove to be an improper merger, 
and not to preserve the effectiveness of the divestiture remedy. This 
position would probably lead to an order less accommodating to the 
mergants than that entered by the Seventh Circuit. Nevertheless, 
under either view it is fair to say that businessmen involved in 
mergers may find it difficult to operate when their carefully gauged 
plans can be at least temporarily thwarted, and perhaps wholly al-
tered, before the legality of the proposed arrangement is finally 
determined. 110 Thus, whichever theory is followed, the courts should 
limit the duration of any injunction that they order so that there 
will be pressure on the FTC to decide on the merits as quickly as 
possible; in this way, some protection may be extended to mergants 
who may not be found to have violated section 7 and who are en-
titled to proceed with their plans with a minimum of delay.111 The 
110. See note 76 supra. Despite the sale of Bowman home delivery routes authorized 
by the Supreme Court's temporary stay, see note 19 supra, as well as by the preliminary 
injunction, the losses incurred by Bowman's former operations during the first two 
quarters of 1966 were $278,566 and $346,965 respectively. Motion for modification of 
Seventh Circuit's preliminary injunction order (July 18, 1966). 
In other situations involving government control of business activity, particularly 
the regulation of stock ownership, it has been demonstrated that when courts attempt 
to protect the status quo pending final determination on the merits, they are likely to 
issue orders which themselves alter the status quo. See Daly, Current Trends in Relief 
Under the Clayton Act, 70 DICK. L. REv. I, 14-17 (1965). 
111. Temporary relief may substantially alter the normal incidents of stock owner-
ship as well as regulate the enjoined corporation's day-to-day business activity. See 
Daly, supra note 110. In fact, the mere grant of a temporary injunction in actions 
brought by the Government has frequently occasioned the abandonment of the 
planned merger. See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. 
Pa. 1963), afj'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 1966 Trade 
Cas. 11 81,958 r,11 .D. Pa. 1965); United States v. Parents Magazine Enterprises, Inc., 
1962 Trade Cas. 11 76,757 (N.D. Ill.), 1963 Trade Cas. 11 77,628 (N.D. Ill.). Compare, 
e.g., United States v. Gimbel Brothers, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (pre-
liminary injunction denied-government voluntarily drops case). This is due in large 
part to the fear that the changes wrought by such an injunction will so affect the 
corporate structures involved as to necessitate abandonment of the planned merger, 
despite the probability that the merger would ultimately be found legal. This appre-
hension accounts in part for Justice Fortas' great concern that a full consideration on 
the merits will result in lengthy proceedings and delays while the FTC "wends its 
leisurely way toward a wearying conclusion." 384 U.S. at 632. 
For example, upon the conclusion of the trial examiner's !:.earing and within such 
time as the hearing examiner may prescribe, the parties are required to file their 
proposed findings and conclusions of law (FTC REG. 3.46); the hearing examiner then 
has ninety days in which to file his initial decision (FTC REG. 3.51); notice of intention 
to appeal such decision is due ten days thereafter; the appellate brief is due thirty 
days after the initial decision; and the answering brief must be filed within thirty 
days following receipt of the appellate brief (FTC REG. 3.52). Thereafter, the FTC 
dockets the case for review, the filing of additional briefs being at the FTC's discretion 
(FTC REG. 3.53). '.Thus, an indefinite period of time may elapse before FTC action. 
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courts should try to force the FTC to complete its hearings before 
the time when effective consummation of the merger could no longer 
take place, but if this time cannot be determined, then they should 
simply require that the FTC issue its final order within a reasonable 
period of time.112 
D. Extensions 
Professor Llewellyn once said that a case "may at the will of the 
court stand either for the narrowest point to which its holding may 
be reduced, or for the widest formulation that its ratio decidendi 
will allow."113 An interesting, but disturbing, aspect of Dean Foods 
Moreover, the examples cited by Justice Fortas at 384 U.S. 597, 631-32 n.17 (1965) and 
accompanying text would seem to indicate that he believes that it will be impossible 
to impose any effective time limitation upon the FTC's consideration of a case. The 
Seventh Circuit's order, however, would appear to accomplish such a result by limit· 
ing the period of injunction to four months. It may be argued that the accelerating 
device used by the Seventh Circuit on remand and approved by this Comment, that 
is, imposing a time limit on the length of a preliminary injunction, forces the FTC 
to abrogate its own procedures and is therefore an unwarranted order. The success 
of this argument seems doubtful, however, since the grant of temporary relief is an 
extraordinary and discretionary remedy in the first place. 
One of the difficulties of accelerated proceedings is highlighted by the FTC's con-
tention on appeal to the Commissioners in the Dean Foods litigation. Prompted by a 
desire to have an ultimate determination before expiration of the four-month injunc-
tion, the Commissioners ordered the hearing examiner to file his initial decision within 
sixty days of the close of evidence, thus giving the examiner only fifteen days after 
the submission of the parties' initial and reply findings in which to prepare his deci-
sion. On appeal from the examiner's decision, the FTC argued that the examiner's 
dismissal of the complaint should be rejected since it "virtually adopted in haec 
verba respondent Dean's proposed findings of fact" and therefore reflected "an absence 
of an independently reasoned analysis of the facts." Brief of Petitioner Before the 
Federal Trade Commission, at 4-5. ·whether or not the contention was true, the 
argument raises a danger inherent in upsetting and accelerating the normal FTC 
procedures. 
Securing a prompt FTC ruling is not a total solution for following their decision, 
a petition for reconsideration may be filed within twenty days, the prevailing party 
having an additional ten days in which to answer such request (FTC REG. 3.55). Bar-
ring reconsideration, however, court of appeals review is commenced by the filing of 
a petition within sixty days after service of the FTC's order. 15 U.S.C. § 2l(c) (1964). 
In the Seventh Circuit, at least, forty days are then allowed for filing the transcript 
of the record [7th Cir. R. 14(g)]; appellant's brief must be filed within thirty days 
after the record is filed (7th Cir. R. 16); respondent's brief is due thirty days later; 
and a further fifteen-day period is provided for the filing of a reply brief (7th Cir. 
R. 16). No time limit is set for the filing of a decision by the court. Presumably, 
similar delays would accompany proceedings in other circuits. In addition, if review 
by the Supreme Court is sought, there will be a further lapse of time. 
112. Then, upon an adequate showing of undue delay, the merging companies 
would be able to get a vacation of the injunction. This, in turn, would discourage 
delaying techniques on the part of the FTC. Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771, 784 (1965). In 
this regard it may be useful to compare the Clayton Act's direction to district courts 
with respect to Department of Justice proceedings to obtain preliminary relief. The 
courts are directed to "proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination 
of the case." 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). See generally note II supra and accompanying text. 
113. LLEWELLYN, INTRODUCTION TO CASES ON SAf..1,:.5 ~ (1930). 
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is that the decision leaves the door open for extending the prelimi-
nary injunctive power to other types of cases besides those poten-
tially involving section 7 violations. If the FTC can proceed under 
the All Writs Act in section 7 cases, the question arises whether it 
will, or should, be allowed to obtain preliminary relief for other 
kinds of antitrust violations. The Supreme Court wrote in Dean 
Foods that "Congress has never restricted the power which the 
courts of appeals may exercise under ... that [All Writs] Act,"114 
and, in addition, the Court is apparently of the opinion that the 
FTC has all powers essential to its operation except those specifically 
denied to it.115 Nothing in the case explicitly limits the FTC's au-
thority to seek and obtain preliminary relief to section 7 cases; thus, 
the FTC may well have the power to seek preliminary relief to 
enjoin violations of section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act,116 sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act,117 and section 5 of the FTC Act. Since 
the Dean Foods case itself involved an allegation of a violation of 
section 5 of the FTC Act, 118 as well as the alleged section 7 violation, 
the argument that preliminary relief should be available for other 
types of violations of section 5 might seem particularly strong.110 It 
is submitted, however, that in Dean Foods the Court's most funda-
mental concern was the need for preserving an effective remedy. 
Thus, the Dean Foods case should be interpreted to bar the FTC 
from seeking preliminary relief in cases in which a denial of such 
relief does not endanger the effectiveness of the final remedy, which 
is the situation in most types of cases dealing with alleged antitrust 
violations.120 On the other hand, it has been suggested that some 
violations, for example, advertising practices attacked as unfair 
under section 5 of the FTC Act, may cause irreparable harm to the 
public interest before the FTC can issue a final order.121 It is argu-
able, by reasoning parallel to that of Justice Fortas' dissent in Dean 
Foods, that in such cases the FTC should have implied power to 
seek preliminary relief. 
114. 384 U.S. at 608. 
115. See note 37 supra. 
116. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). 
117. An exclusive-dealing case offers a possible example. Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962): 
Congress not only indicated that the "tests of illegality [under § 7] are intended 
to be similar to those which the courts have applied in interpreting the same 
language as used in other sections of the Clayton Act", but also chose for § 7 
language virtually identical to that of§ 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, which 
had been interpreted by this court to require an examination of the interde-
pendence of the market share foreclosed by, and the economic purpose of, the 
vertical arrangement. 
118. 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1964). 
119. The false advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics is already expressly sub-
ject to FTC suit for preliminary injunction under § 12 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 52 (1964). 
120. For example, in price fixing or price discrimination cases, treble damages 
would seemingly provide injured parties with a fully adequate remedy. 
121. In the case of false advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics the FTC would 
not have to :resort to implied power. See note 119 supra. 
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It remains to be seen whether the FTC will exercise restraint 
and petition for preliminary relief only when it is necessary to main-
tain the effectiveness of the final order. Such restraint seems doubt-
ful, however, since some of the Commissioners have indicated 
that they may try to obtain preliminary relief in Robinson-Patman 
cases,122 and since the FTC has long taken the position that it has 
broad equitable powers under section 11 of the Clayton Act.123 
Moreover, it is quite possible that other agencies may now attempt 
to assert implied powers to obtain preliminary relief under the All 
Writs Act. Finally, as noted earlier,124 it is conceivable that the FTC, 
or other agencies following its lead, may attempt to obtain the right 
to issue preliminary orders on its own, without resort to either 
circuit or district courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the FTC has been granted a power that, while perhaps 
founded on sound theoretical considerations, finds no conclusive 
support in express statutory language. Although it may be desirable 
to strengthen the remedial arsenal at the disposal of the FTC, the 
procedural difficulties involved in implementing the decision in 
Dean Foods, as well as the disruptive effects the decision may have 
on the business community, argue strongly for limiting its applica-
tion. The courts should adopt a strict standard for assessing FTC 
requests for preliminary relief. Further, they should develop some 
flexible procedure for conducting hearings, perhaps referring com-
plex fact-finding duties to impartial masters or referees. 
Despite the criticisms that may be directed at Dean Foods, the 
Supreme Court's decision may have the salutary effect of eliminat-
ing the paralyzing delays that typically mark the FTC's considera-
tion of merger cases. If the emphasis in ordering temporary relief 
is placed upon protecting the divestiture remedy, as the Court's 
opinion suggests that it should be, the courts of appeals will have 
considerable leeway in framing their orders and they can force the 
FTC to adjudicate the merits of a merger within a reasonable period 
of time. Only if this interpretation of Dean Foods is adopted will 
businessmen be able to carry on their plans for merger without com-
plete frustration and uncertainty, for otherwise the FTC's ability to 
obtain preliminary relief will give it virtually unbridled power over 
the practical ability of companies to merge. 
James H. Cohen* 
122. See BNA ANTITRUST&: TRADE REG. REP. No. 267, at B-4, Aug. 23, 1967. 
123. See, e.g., Freuhauf Trailer Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. tJ 17,292 (July 19, 1965); 
Ekco Products Co., 1965 TRADE REG. REP. 1l 71,487 (FTC 1964); see note 42 supra. 
124. See note 94 supra and accompanying text. 
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